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COMBINATION PATENTS AND SYNERGISM:'
MUST 2 + 2 = 5?
The American patent system developed in an atmosphere of colonial
concern over the flagrant abuse of monopolies in England.1 The Constitu-
tion's framers gave Congress a very limited power to establish a system
for granting monopolies to inventors. 2 Cognizant of the need to stimulate
progress in science and the useful arts, the framers of the Constitution
intended that the patent power should induce a free exchange of knowl-
edge essential to this progress.3 Reacting to the blatant misuse of English
patents, however, the drafters' overriding concern was that the patent
clause strictly limited the granting of monopolies so that patents would
not remove existing knowledge from the public domain.4 Congress at-
tempted to carry out the drafters' intent by establishing the patent sys-
'The climate in the United 8tates at the time the Constitution was drafted was very
antagonistic toward monopolies. This distrust of monopolies grew out of the English prac-
tice of granting monopolies for common items to friends of the Crown. Thus, the colonists
wanted to limit the ability of the government to grant patents which would serve to remove
existing knowledge from the public domain. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-10
(1965); Sears, Combination Patents and 35 U.S.C. § 103, 1977 Da-r. C.L. R.v. 83, 88-89
[hereinafter cited as Sears]. See generally H. Fox, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS (1947).
' The Constitution gives Congress the power "To promote the progress of ... useful
Arts, securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discover-
ies." U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Sears, supra note 1, at 88-89; Comment, Patentability
of Mechanical Combinations-A Definition of Synergism, 57 TEx. L. Rav. 1043, 1043
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Definition of Synergism].
3 In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the Court cited Thomas Jefferson's
opposition to monopolies. Although Jefferson was a motivating force behind the early patent
system, he initially was doubtful that the benefit of limited monopolies in the form of pat-
ents would outweigh the burdens inherent to monopolies. See id. at 7-8. Although denying
that an inventor had any natural right to a patent, Jefferson nevertheless believed that soci-
ety should give the inventor a right to receive some benefit from his discovery. Further, in
order to encourage scientists and inventors to pursue knowledge and to share their ideas
and insights with the public, some form of economic inducement would be necessary. The
inducement, chosen by Jefferson and the other constitutional drafters, took the form of al-
lowing an inventor a limited private monopoly by granting exclusive patent rights to the
inventor for a specified number of years. Jefferson, however, emphasized that strict stan-
dards must be observed to determine what inventions were "worth to the public the em-
barassment of an exclusive patent." XIII THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 333-36 (Lips-
comb ed. 1905).
" In Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292 (1838), the Supreme Court recognized the
intent of the constitutional provision to benefit the public. The Court perceived the patent
system as the public giving the inventor a profitable limited monopoly in exchange for mak-
ing the discovery available to society. Id. at 320. Congress, therefore, may not authorize
patents which would stifle progress in technology by removing knowledge from the public
domain. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972). See also Irons & Sears, The
Constitutional Standard of Invention-The Touchstone for Patent Reform, 1973 UTAH L.
Rav. 653, 654-58 [hereinafter cited as Irons & Sears].
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tern. Codified in Title 35 of the United States Code, the standards by
which an invention is judged for patentability are utility, novelty and
nonobviousness.5
The nonobviousness requirement for patentability, originally a judicial
creation, was codified in 1952 as section 103 of Title 35.7 Under section
103, an invention is not patentable if the subject matter of the patent is
obvious to a skilled person.8 One of the most controversial aspects of the
nonobviousness requirement lies in its relationship and application to
combination patents. Combination patents involve new arrangements of
components, all of which are well known in the prior art,1° and thus, are
especially difficult to judge for obviousness.11 In Graham v. John Deere
Co.12 the Supreme Court first interpreted section 103 in relation to com-
bination patents and developed a three prong test for obviousness." Two.
5 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at 35 US.C. § 103 (1976)).
The patent system was initially established by the Patent Act of 1790. The Act provided
that a board made up of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Attorney
General could, with the vote of any two members issue a valid patent for a period of four-
teen years for an invention which was "sufficiently useful and important." Patent Act of
1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110.
The Patent Act of 1793 established the first statutory requirements of novelty and util-
ity. Patent Act of 1793, Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§
101 & 102 (1976)). Responding to the Supreme Court's line of decisions holding that the
Constitution imposed the further requirement that a patent could only be issued to an in-
ventor and, therefore, the device must be an invention to be patentable, Congress later es-
tablished the further requirement that the subject of the patent must not be obvious to one
skilled in the art.
6 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851); see text accompanying notes
17-27 infra.
7 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). The nonobviousness requirement was codified in the Patent
Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952).
S 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). Section 103 provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary- skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
' See Sullivan, Trends in Section 103-Graham v. Deere, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
PATENT LAW 1976, 253, 255 (G. Coplien, ed.) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan] (more patents
are held invalid for obviousness than for any other reason).
10 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 150 (1950).
Patent claims for a combination usually involve the aggregation or rearrangement of several
component parts. All or most of the components are either common or the subject of a
previous patent. Id.
" The A&P Court examined a combination patent and found that, due to the nature of
a combination, the probability that the claim would be sufficiently innovative to be patenta-
ble was low. The Court further cautioned that combination patents must be examined much
closer than other patents to ensure that existing knowledge is not being removed from the
public domain. Id. at 151-52.
12 383 U.S. 1 (1966); see text accompanying notes 35-53 infra.
13 383 U.S. at 17; see text accompanying notes 43-53 infra.
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subsequent Supreme Court decisions14 have raised the issue of whether
the Court has imposed the additional requirement that a combination ex-
hibit a "synergistic effect"15 in order to be patentable.16 The Court could
interpret section 103 to require a combination to result in an effect which
is more than the total effect achieved by each individual component func-
tioning together.
The patent statute enacted in 1793 required only that the invention
be novel and useful. The constitutional clause providing for granting
patents, however, limited patent issuance to "inventors" for their discov-
eries.18 In 1851, therefore, the Supreme Court judicially imposed a third
condition of "invention" in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.19 The Hotchkiss
Court found that the object of the patent must be the work of an inventor
and not merely a skillful mechanic. 20 Thus, a discovery which is obvious
or is developed according to well-known principles is not the work of an
inventor and is outside the constitutional scope of the patent system.
2
Applying the inventor or invention requirement, the Hotchkiss Court
held that the substitution of porcelain or clay for wood or metal in door-
knobs required no more skill and ingenuity than that possessed by an
ordinary person skilled in the art.22
By judicially imposing the additional requirement of invention, the
Hotchkiss Court gave effect to the constitutional limitation that the dis-
covery be an invention. The Court later reinforced its position and em-
14 Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pave-
ment Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969); see text accompanying notes 53-75 infra.
15 Synergism is the coperative action of discrete elements in a manner that the total
effect is greater than the sum of the two effects taken independently. WEBSTER'S SEv ENTH
NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 894 (1965). The Seventh Circuit devoted a large part of its
decision in Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979) to formu-
lating a workable definition of synergism. The court examined other courts' definition of the
term and found that the concept of synergism requires that the combination yield some-
thing more than the sum of the component parts. Id. at 969; see text accompanying notes
82-87 infra. See generally Definition of Synergism, supra note 2.
"6 Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Corp., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969); see text accompanying notes 112-13 infra.
" Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1976).
Since Congress has never attempted to define novelty, the interpretation of the requirement
has been judicially determined. Generally, novelty requires that the invention has not been
previously known or used. See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818). The
utility requirement is rarely addressed by the courts and seems clear on its face. The Court
in Graham considered the requirement in passing, finding that "the 'new and useful' tests
which have always existed in the statutory scheme ... need no clarification." 383 U.S. at
12. See also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Link Aviation, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 106, 112-13 (N.D.N.Y.
1959) (utility is relative and requires only practicability rather than perfection).
U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Irons & Sears, supra note 3, at 655-57, 679.
19 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851). In Hotchkiss, the plaintiff sued for the alleged infringe-
ment of his patent by the defendant, who asserted the invalidity of the patent as a defense.
Id. at 264.
20 Id. at 267.
21 See Irons & Sears, supra note 5, at 655-56; text accompanying notes 3, 6, & 18 supra.
21 52 U.S. at 266. See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1965).
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phasized that a mere improvement, lacking in ingenuity or invention, is
not entitled to patent protection.2 3 Although the Supreme Court contin-
ued to impose the invention requirement during the intervening cen-
tury,2 4 the lower federal courts applied the requirement inconsistently
due to the difficulty of defining what constituted an invention.2 5 Also, the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), charged with primary responsibility
for issuing patentss2 6 employed a very liberal standard of patentability
with little, if any, regard for the invention requirement.
7
23 See Pierce v. Mulford, 102 U.S. 112, 118 (1880).
' See, e.g., Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)
(concept of invention in combinations "elusive" and thus not likely to be patentable); Collar
Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 530 (1875) (requiring invention to support patent);
Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 72 (1885) (invention is something new resulting
from intuitive faculty of mind); see Comment, Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.: Combination Pat-
ents Now Require Synergistic Effects, 15 Hous. L. REv. 157, 159-61 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Combination Patents] (review of judicial history of invention requirement from
1851 through 1952).
26 Federal circuit courts split in their attempt to define invention. One approach in-
volved an analysis based on objective evidence. See, e.g., United States Hat Mach. Corp. v.
Boesch Mfg. Co., 108 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1939) (relying on objective evidence of "long felt
need"); Trico Prod. Corp. v. Apco-Mossberg Corp., 45 F.2d 594 (1st Cir. 1930) (relying on
evidence of commercial success). The alternate approach involved a subjective determina-
tion of whether the claim was sufficiently important to constitute an invention. See, e.g.,
Kirsch Mfg. Co. v. Gould Mersereau Co., 6 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1925). The Supreme Court
recognized the difficulty of defining, and therefore, applying the invention requirement as
early as 1891. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891). Since each court developed its
own definition of invention, the standard of patentability varied with each court's applica-
tion of its definition. See Edell, The Supreme Court and Section 103, 5 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J.
99, 99-100 (1977).
2' Application for a patent is initially made to an examining division of the Patent
Office. An assistant examiner makes the original decision whether a patent should issue. A
primary examiner reviews the initial decision if it is unfavorable to the applicant. Upon
rejection of a patent by the examining division, the applicant may appeal to the Board of
Appeals of the Patent Office. In the event that the Board of Appeals affirms the rejection,
the applicant may seek judicial review in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia or the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145 (1976); see Reynolds, The Stan-
dard of Invention in the Patent Office in DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, 1, 3-9 (W. Ball,
ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as Reynolds].
2 Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. at 156-58 (Douglas,
J., concurring). Noting the large number of patents issued by the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) subsequently invalidated by the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas implied that
the PTO was not applying the judicial "invention" standard when determining whether an
invention was patentable. Id.; see text accompanying note 32 infra. One reason for the more
liberal standard applied by the PTO is inherent in the system itself. The initial determina-
tion of patentability is made by an individual patent examiner. The examiner is constrained
by PTO rules to resolve doubts as to patentability in favor of the inventor. See note 26
supra. Further, the backload of cases in the PTO and the lack of available time for in-depth
examination of each application tend to decrease the standard which the invention must
meet. See Reynolds, supra note 26, at 5. Underlying the tehdency to grant patents to appli-
cants is the fact that no review of the examiner's decision is triggered unless the decision is
to reject the patent application. The administrative and judicial review of the issuing of a
patent thus tends to lower, rather than raise the standard of patentability. Id. at 6-9; see
1980] 1209
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In 1950, the Supreme Court reiterated that novelty and usefulness,
absent a showing of invention, were insufficient to sustain the validity of
a patent. In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment
Corp.," the Court considered the validity of a patent for an elongated
cashier's counter with a movable rack for sliding goods from one end of
the counter to the other. Finding that the extension of the counter was
the only claim to novelty in the combination, the Court held that the
combination of old elements lacked the concerted action of an invention
necessary for patentability. 9 The A&P Court warned the lower courts
that the validity of a patent for a mere aggregation of old elements could
not be sustained when the "effect is to subtract from former resources
freely available to skilled artisans."30 Thus, the Court enforced the consti-
tutional limitation of removing knowledge from the public domain s.3 Con-
curring in A&P, Justice Douglas criticized the PTO and lower courts for
failing to apply a high standard of scrutiny when determining whether an
invention was patentable. Justice Douglas pointed to twenty patents
which the Supreme Court previously had held to be invalid for lack of
invention as illustrative of the great departure of the patent system from
the governing constitutional standards.3 2
Attempting to standardize the application of the judicial invention re-
quirement and to eliminate the departure from constitutional limitations,
Congress added the requirement of nonobviousness to existing Patent Act
requirements of novelty and utility.33 Section 103 of the Patent Act of
1952 provides that an invention is not patentable if "the differences be-
tween the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a
person having ordinary skill in the art."" Fourteen years after the enact-
ment of section 103, the Supreme Court considered the section for the
first time in Graham v. John Deere Co.35 The validity of two combination
patents was contested on the grounds that, as new arrangements of ele-
note 43, infra.
28 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
2 Id. at 150-51.
30 Id. at 152.
3, Id.; see text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
32 340 U.S. at 156-58 (Douglas, J., concurring); see text accompanying notes 24-27
supra.
13 Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976)); see
S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1952). The Senate and House Reports explained that § 103 was a legislative attempt to
standardize the application of the judical "invention" standard and to include the standard
in the statutory patent scheme. Judge Rich, drafter of § 103, however, contends that § 103 is
a substitution for the invention requirement intended to revise rather than strictly codify
former case law. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention" Requirements, 1 AM. PAT.
L.A.Q.J., 26, 34-38 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Rich].
34 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976); see note 9 supra.
3- 383 U.S. 1 (1966). Graham was the first Supreme Court case to deal with the issue of
patent validity since the Court decided A&P in 1950. Id. at 3.
[Vol. XXXVII
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ments well known in the prior art, the inventions did not meet the nonob-
vious requirement of section 103.36 The Court examined the history of the
patent system, case law prior to 1952, and the legislative history of the
Patent Act of 1952.11 Relying primarily upon the House and Senate Re-
ports and the Reviser's Notes," the Graham Court concluded that Con-
gress intended section 103 to be a codification of the existing strict judi-
cial standard of patentability requiring invention.3 9 The Court found that
Congress meant to give the requirement uniformity by codifying the ex-
isting case law which construed the invention requirement as one of non-
obviousness. ° The Graham Court reasoned that nonobviousness was a
more objective standard than invention because nonobviousness is based
upon factual inquiries rather than the quality of the discovery. The con-
cept of nonobviousness to one skilled in the applicable art thus replaced
that of invention as a more objective and workable standard. 41 As a result
of the Graham Court's finding that section 103 codified rather than re-
jected judicial precedent, the Supreme Court may utilize pre-1952 case
law in delineating the inquiries necessary to a judicial determination of
obviousness.
42
The Court in Graham set forth three basic factual inquiries to guide a
court in ascertaining the obviousness of the subject matter of a patent
36 In Graham, the Court consolidated three cases involving two distinct combination
patents. In two separate suits for patent infringement, both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
had considered the validity of the Graham patent for a shank plow clamp. The Fifth Circuit
held the patent valid in Jeoffroy Mfg., Inc. v. Graham, 219 F.2d 511, cert. denied, 350 U.S.
826 (1955), while the Eighth Circuit held the patent invalid, John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333
F.2d 529 (1964). These cases were consolidated to resolve the conflict between the circuits.
Applying the test developed in Graham, the Eighth Circuit held valid a patent for a finger
operated sprayer for bottles in Colmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co., 336 F.2d 110 (1965). The
Supreme Court consolidated the three cases to consider the impact of § 103 on the judicial
invention requirement and to ascertain what tests § 103 requires. 383 U.S. at 3. The Su-
preme Court developed a three prong inquiry to determine obviousness and held that
neither patent was valid under § 103. Id. at 4-5.
3,See id. at 5-17; note 33 supra.
" See 383 U.S. at 14-17. The Reviser's Notes had originally given § 103 the title of
"conditions for patentability, lack of invention." 383 U.S. at 14 n.6. In explaining the pur-
pose of § 103 as incorporating the judicial invention requirement, both the House and Sen-
ate Reports stated that § 103 statutorily provides a requirement which has existed judicially
for more than 100 years. S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952). See also note 32 supra.
31 383 U.S. at 17; see Sears, supra note 2, at 85 n.17; Sullivan, supra note 9, at 260-61.
But see note 33, supra.
40 See 383 U.S. at 17; Sullivan, supra note 9, at 261.
383 U.S. at 16-17.
42 See 383 U.S. at 19. The Graham Court, finding that Congress did not intend to lower
the strict judicial standards of patentability, reasoned that precedent case law was codified
rather than overruled. This attitude of the Supreme Court as to the viability of pre-1952
case law is further exemplified by the reliance of the Court on pre-1952 cases in Anderson's-
Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60-61 (1969) and Sakraida v. Ag Pro,
Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 280-83 (1976).
12111980]
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claim.43 The Court has applied the theoretical three step test to all subse-
quent cases in which patent validity is contested under section 103. 4" The
first inquiry of obviousness concerns the state of the prior art.4 5 Evaluat-
ing the prior art, the Court focused on two prior patents for devices com-
posed of essentially the same elements as the contested patent.46 Since
Graham, the Court has examined current practices in the relevant field as
a source of evidence contributing to the prior art. In Dann v. Johnson,'
47
the PTO had rejected petitioners' patent claim for a mechanized system
for recording bank checks and deposits. The PTO concluded that, based
upon the established uses of digital computers in the banking field, the
system was an obvious variation of a previous patent for a similar system.
The Supreme Court affirmed the PTO patent rejection, reasoning that
current uses of digital computers in the field was an important element of
the prior art.
4
The second Graham inquiry is directed to the differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue. One basis for determining the extent of
the difference between the patent claim and the prior art is expert testi-
mony.49 Finally, a court must define the ordinary skill in the relevant
art 5O in order to decide the ultimate issue of whether the subject matter
of the patent claim was obvious to one skilled in the art.5' The last two
factual inquiries often are consolidated into a one step analysis.52 Even
43 383 U.S. at 17-19. After describing the three factual inquiries to be made when any
patent is examined for obviousness, the Court concluded that strict observance of these
tests will yield the uniformity sought by Congress in enacting § 103. The Court went on to
chastise the PTO for failing to maintain a high standard for patentability. The Court con-
cluded that although the test set forth in Graham was intended for application by the
courts, the PTO should apply at least as stringent a standard in the initial determination of
patentability. Id. at 18-19; see note 27 supra.
44 See Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 280 (1976); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S.
219, 226 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 59
(1969).
45 383 U.S. at 22.
46 Id. at 22-24. Before narrowing the discussion to two patents, the Court examined
seventeen prior patents cited by the parties as pertinent to the determination of the prior
art. The two prior patents considered by the Court as significant to the determination of
obviousness were for clamps which were similar to the clamp at issue in all but two ele-
ments. Id. at 22.
47 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
46 Id. at 227.
41 383 U.S. at 17; see, e.g., Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Sidney Mfg. Corp., 594 F.2d 644, 651 n.9
(8th Cir. 1979).
50 383 U.S. at 17. In determining the level of ordinary skill in the relevant art, a court
usually focuses on the issue of what is the relevant art. In Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Sidney Mfg.
Corp., 594 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1979), the Eighth Circuit relied on trial testimony to find that
the level of skill relevant to the patent was that of a student experienced in structural engi-
neering. Id. at 651.
383 U.S. at 17-18.
82 In Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969), the
Supreme Court combined an analysis of the difference between the claim and the prior art
and the obviousness of that difference. The Black Rock claim involved four previously pat-
[Vol. XXXVII
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the Supreme Court, applying the three-prong test for the first time to the
Graham patent, proceeded directly from a determination of the scope of
the prior art to a consideration of the obviousness of the differences."
Although the Supreme Court has applied the three step Graham anal-
ysis.uniformly, subsequent Supreme Court cases have created uncertainty
concerning whether Graham delineates the sole test of obviousness under
section 103." In Anderson's-Black Rock Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.,5s
the Court addressed the validity of a patent issued for the combination of
a radiant heat burner and the elements of a standard paving machine
which include a bituminous spreader, a tamper, and a screed.5 s All four of
these devices were the subject of prior valid patents and the patent in
issue merely claimed the invention of combining all the components on
one single chassis.5 7 The Court made the factual inquiries prescribed by
Graham and concluded that the combination was obvious to one skilled
in the art58 Recognizing the constitutional limitation that Congress can-
not allow a patent to remove existing knowledge from the public, the
Court rejected the validity of the patent on the grounds of obviousness.8 9
As a part of the obviousness determination, the Black Rock Court con-
sidered the manner in which the components of the system function to-
gether. Citing A&P, the Court affirmed the district court's finding that
the concerted action of the elements must result in a function which is
greater than that of the sum of the elements functioning separately.60 The
Supreme Court referred to the functioning of the individual elements in a
manner in which the resultant effect is greater than the sum of the effects
of each component as a "synergistic result." l The Court then focused on
the lack of synergism in the combination as a partial basis for the conclu-
sion that the invention was obvious to one skilled in the art and therefore
not patentable.
2
ented elements combined into one invention. Finding no difference between the function of
the elements alone or in combination, the Supreme Court held the combination to be obvi-
ous to one skilled in the relevant art. Id. at 62-63.
13 383 U.S. at 24.
See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 372 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Graham was sole test of obviousness), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1276 (1980); text accompany-
ing notes 75-109 infra. See generally Combination Patents, supra note 24.
55 396 U.S, 57 (1969).
"Id. at 58.
57 Pavement Salvage Co. v. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 941, 946 (S.D. W.
Va. 1967), afl'd, 396 U.S. 57 (1969). The district court found that all the elements of the
combination were well known in the prior art. Furthermore, the concept of using radiant
heat to avoid joints in asphalt pavement was also well known in the construction field. The
court, thus, found the patent invalid for obviousness. Id. at 944-46.
396 U.S. at 61-63.
9 Id. at 61; see note 3 supra; text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
60 Id. at 59-60. See also 308 F. Supp. at 945-46.
61 396 U.S. at 61. The Court had previously discussed the synergistic concept without
actually applying the specific term in A&P. 340 U.S. at 150-52; see text accompanying notes
28-31 supra & 65-66 infra.
42 396 U.S. at 62. The Court rejected any consideration of the commercial success of the
1980] 1213
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The consideration of synergism employed by the Black Rock Court
had its roots in the pre-section 103 A&P case.63 The A&P Court had rea-
soned that a combination in which each component performed the same
function as before combination was unpatentable because it lacked inven-
tion.6 The element necessary for a combination to be patentable was the
additional contribution made by the components working cooperatively.65
The Black Rock Court found the concept of a cooperative action or syn-
ergy among the components to be equally applicable to the section 103
nonobviousness requirement.6 6 Thus, the Black Rock Court did not elimi-
nate or even modify the Graham inquiry into obviousness. The Black
Rock Court held that in the case of combination patents, after making
the three Graham determinations, the finding of synergism in the combi-
nation was one indicia that the combination was nonobvious.
67
In Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.,6 s the Supreme Court again held that,
against the backdrop of the three-prong obviousness test, a synergistic
effect in a combination is an indication of obviousness. The Sakraida pat-
ent described a system for flushing manure from the floors of dairy barns.
The system involved an arrangement of water tanks and water damming
devices which delivered a cascading sheet of water to produce a more ef-
fective flushing than previous methods utilizing water delivered through
pipes.6 9 Following the Graham inquiries the Sakraida Court initially ana-
lyzed the prior art and found all the components of the combination to be
old and well-known.7 0 Consequently, the Court held that the combination
was obvious to a person skilled in the pertinent art.71 Relying on the
warning of the A&P Court that combinations are inherently susceptible
to a lack of invention, the Sakraida Court considered the absence of syn-
ergism in the ultimate legal decision that the patent was invalid.7 2 The
combination as irrelevant if the combination is not innovative. The Court initially made the
inquiries pursuant to the Graham analysis. The Court, however, subsequently considered
the lack of a synergistic effect as one indication of the obviousness of the combination. Id. at
61-62.
340 U.S. 147 (1950); see text accompanying notes 28-31 supra.
340 U.S. at 153; see text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
340 U.S. at 152; see text accompanying notes 115-123 infra.
396 U.S. at 61-62.
6 Id. at 61; see Sears, supra note 2, at 83-84 (emphasizing that specific factual inquiries
of Graham must always be followed).
425 U.S. 273 (1976).
6 Id. at 274-75. The combination in issue was a combination of common elements. Ad-
ditionally, the cascading effect of the water resulted from the action of gravity, a basic prin-
ciple of science. Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), basic principles of science and phenomena of
nature are not within the scope of patentable subject matter. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 62 (1853).
70 425 U.S. at 280-81.
" Id. at 281-82.
72 Id. The Seventh Circuit in Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963
(7th Cir. 1979), reasoned that the Supreme Court only mentioned synergism in the Sakraida
decision because the Fifth Circuit had based its holding on the lack of synergism. The court
in Republic Industries interpreted the Supreme Court's position in Sakraida as one of re-
[Vol. XXXVII
PATENTS AND SYNERGISM
Court, however, also assessed the combination in the Hotchkiss terms of
"the work of a skillful mechanic, not that of an inventor. 7 3 Thus, even
though the system provided a more effective result than previous combi-
nations, the combining of the elements and the resultant effect of the
combination was found to be the work of a skilled mechanic and, there-
fore, obvious to a person skilled in the pertinent art.7
4
The consideration of the presence of a synergistic effect by the Court
in Black Rock and Sakraida has caused confusion among the circuit
courts with regard to the proper standard to be applied in ascertaining
the validity of a combination patent.7 Circuit court treatment of the syn-
ergism concept has varied greatly, with some circuits finding that syner-
gism is an additional requirement for nonobviousness, while other circuits
totally reject any relevance of synergism to the nonobviousness standard.
In IT&T Corp. v. Raychem Corp.,76 the First Circuit held that a synergis-
tic effect was an absolute requirement for finding a combination patent
nonobvious under section 103.17 The patent involved described a type of
wire insulation consisting of a primary layer of cross-linked polyolefin and
a secondary outer layer of a cross-linked polyvinylidine flouride intended
for use in transmission of electronic signals in aircraft. A necessary char-
acteristic of the insulation not found in the polyolefin alone was that the
insulation be exceptionally flame retardant. Based upon prior knowledge
of the two components, the combination should not have been flame re-
tardant. A chemical reaction occurred between the two components, how-
ever, which resulted in an unexpected flame retarding substance.78 The
First Circuit first made the required Graham inquiries, but held that the
standard upon which the patent's validity turned was whether the result
was greater than the sum of the effect of the parts. Finding that the evi-
dence established a sufficient synergistic effect, the court upheld the va-
lidity of the patent.
79
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit, followed by the Second 0 and Tenth
jecting the requirement of synergism. Id. at 968 n.17.
73 18 U.S. (11 How.) at 267; see 425 U.S. at 281-82; text accompanying notes 19-21
supra.
7' 425 U.S. at 282. See generally Sears, supra note 2, at 101.
75See Definition of Synergism, supra note 2, at 1043; note 57 supra; text accompany-
ing notes 77-109 infra.
78 538 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 886 (1977).
7 Id. at 457.
78 Id. at 455-56.
71 Id. The First Circuit examined the combination of the two polymeric substances to
determine if the idea of combining them was obvious. The court found that the initial addi-.
tion of antimony oxide to the polyolefin was not obvious. Further, when the antimony oxide
and the hydrogen flouride of the polyvinylidene were combined in the insulation the com-
pounds reacted to form the active flame retarding compound, antimony flouride. Neither
the reaction nor the physical characteristic of the reaction product could be predicted.
Therefore, the court found the patent valid on the basis of a "sufficient synergistic effect."
Id. at 457.
80 The Second Circuit cited Republic Indus. Inc., v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963 (7th
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Circuits,81 has totally rejected any consideration of synergism. In Repub-
lic Industries, Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co.,82 the Seventh Circuit determined
that synergism "does not bear any logical ipso facto relationship to obvi-
ousness.""s Based upon an examination of Supreme Court case law, the
Seventh Circuit held that the Graham analysis was the appropriate
means for determining obviousness under section 103.84 The court em-
phasized that both the Black Rock and Sakraida decisions ultimately
turned on a finding of obviousness pursuant to a Graham type analysis
and that neither decision explicitly stated that a synergistic effect was
essential to a finding of nonobviousness.8 5 The major flaw in the syner-
gism concept cited by the Seventh Circuit was that synergism focuses on
the result of the combination rather than the obviousness of making the
combination. s6 The Seventh Circuit thus employed the standard Graham
analysis to reach the conclusion that the patent was invalid for obvi-
ousness because it was no more than the work of a skillful mechanic."7
The Sixth Circuit in Smith v. ACME General Corp.8 relied upon the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning to find that synergism is not a requirement of
nonobviousness but rather an allusion to the idea that an "unique es-
sence" is required for a combination to be patentable.89 Considering a
patent involving door hardware hinges, the court made a determination of
the scope of the prior art pursuant to the first prong of the Graham anal-
ysis. The court found that all of the elements of the hinge were well
known in the prior art. Further, the court found that the current claim
and the prior art differed only in the arrangement of the elements.90 In a
seemingly contradictory holding, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that because
the combination of the elements did not exhibit synergism the claim lack-
Cir. 1979) with approval, holding that the analytical guidelines prescribed by Graham were
the sole indicia relevant to a determination of obviousness. Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 369 (2d Cir. 1979).
81 The Tenth Circuit also rejected any consideration of synergism in the determination
of obviousness in Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics, Inc., 607 F.2d 885 (10th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 672 (1980). The Tenth Circuit based its rationale for total
reliance upon the Graham inquiry on Republic Industries and Champion Spark Plug. See
592 F.2d at 970-71. See also Rich, supra note 33, at 41-44.
82 592 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979).
83 Id. at 971.
84 Id. at 970-71.
85 Id. at 968.
86 Id. at 970-71.
Id. at 974.
88 614 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1980).
88 Id. at 1094-95. The Sixth Circuit adopted two major points of the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning in Republic Industries. The Smith court agreed that the concept of synergism has
no direct relationship to obviousness. See text accompanying note 82 supra. Furthermore,
the court cited approvingly, the Republic Industries determination that the concept of syn-
ergism focuses on the combination after the fact, while obviousness should be determined at
the time the combination is made. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
80 Smith v. ACME Gen. Corp., 614 F.2d 1086, 1091-93 (6th Cir. 1980).
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ed the unique essence necessary to patentability under section 103.91 Ap-
parently, the court merely substituted a more ambiguous standard of an
unique essence for the already confusing synergism concept.
In Sims v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,9 2 the Third Circuit did not reach the
issue of whether synergism was required to uphold the validity of a com-
bination patent. The patent at issue involved a front discharge concrete
mixer which was constructed by reversing the mixer drum on an ordinary
concrete mixer.9 3 The court relied upon the Black Rock and Sakraida
Courts' recognition of the constitutional prohibition against removing
knowledge from the public domain by the issuance of a patent.9' Since
the Third Circuit held that under a strict Graham analysis the patent
was invalid for obviousness, a consideration of synergism was unnecessary
to the decision. The court, however, found that a proper application of
the Graham test required a consideration of whether a combination func-
tioned in an innovative manner.95 The Third Circuit apparently substi-
tuted an "innovative manner" for synergism as an indicia of nonobvious-
ness, similar to the Sixth Circuit's substitution of an unique essence.
The Fourth Circuit thus far has avoided any direct consideration of
the synergism concept. Justice Clark, sitting by designation following his
retirement from the Supreme Court, authored the Fourth Circuit's most
recent consideration of patent validity in light of section 103.9s Applying
a strict Graham analysis to a patent describing a warp knitted elastic
fabric, the court found the combination to be obvious and not patenta-
ble.Y The court engaged in a limited discussion of the standard to be
applied and subsequently made the appropriate Graham inquiries as to
the scope of the prior art and the difference between the current claim
and two previous patents which contained the elements of the disputed
patent.98 The court found that the difference between the claim of the
patent and the prior art was not great enough to support a finding of
nonobviousness.99 The court thus found it unnecessary to reach the issue
11 Id. at 1095.
9' 608 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1319 (1980).
11 Id. at 88.
Id. at 90; see text accompanying notes 3 & 18-21 supra & 113-14 infra.
" 608 F.2d at 91.
Deering Milliken Res. Corp. v. Beaunit Corp., 538 F.2d 1022 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 936 (1976). Justice Clark was the author of the Supreme Court opinion in Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), but had retired from the Supreme Court before either
the Black Rock or Sakraida opinions were issued. Arguably, Justice Clark, by remaining
silent on the synergism issue, was expressing his opinion that the Graham inquiries were
sufficient for a proper determination of obviousness.
" 538 F.2d at 1026.
" Id. at 1023-25.
The Fourth Circuit examined the prior art and found that a prior patent fully dis-
closed the patent claim at issue. The court finding that the fabrics would be identical if one
inelastic thread were removed from the invention in the prior patent held that this differ-
ence was not significant enough to warrant a patent. Id. at 1026.
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of synergism as an indication of obviousness. 00
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied the synergism concept
consistently with the Black Rock and Sakraida opinions. The Eighth Cir-
cuit in Reinke Manufacturing Co. v. Sidney Manufacturing Corp.,101
strictly followed the Graham analysis in determining the validity of a
patent for a circular irrigation system. The court initially found that the
relevant standard of obviousness under section 103 is set forth in Gra-
ham. The Eighth Circuit, finding that a mere improvement over the prior
art is not necessarily patentable,0 2 recognized the great difficulty in ex-
amining a combination patent for obviousness or invention.10 3 The court
then held that synergism was one factor which may be considered against
the background developed by the Graham inquiries in the court's final
determination of obviousness.'" The court reasoned that in examining a
combination patent, both the actual making of the combination as well as
the resultant effect were subject to the determination of obviousness.
1 0 5
In Satco, Inc. v. Transequip, Inc.,1 06 the Ninth Circuit approved the
district court's reliance upon the lack of a synergistic result by holding
the patent invalid for obviousness.107 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that
a strict adherence to the factual inquiries of Graham was essential to the
consideration of patent validity relative to section 103. The Ninth Circuit
found the district court, having made the necessary Graham inquiries,
was justified in considering the lack of a synergistic effect in making the
ultimate obvious-nonobvious determination.0 8 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
determined that synergism was a proper indication of obviousness when
considered in relation to the factual inquiries of Graham. s09
The varied responses of the circuits have resulted from an attempt to
develop a definite standard from the Supreme Court's several references
to synergism.110 In Black Rock and Sakraida the Court initially made the
1oo Id.
101 594 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1979).
1* Id. at 646; see Airlite Plastics Co. v. Plastilite Corp., 526 F.2d 1078, 1082 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 938 (1976).
103 594 F.2d at 652.
104 Id. at 648.
11 Id. at 648, 651-52.
10 594 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1979). The patent at issue in Satco involved an all metal
cargo pallet for use with aircraft. The difference between this cargo pallet and previously
patented pallets was that the center panel was made of flexible aluminum instead of an
easily torn, laminated material. The Satco patent also claimed the advantages of vertical
and horizontal flexibility resulting from the all aluminum construction. Id. at 1320.
107 Id. at 1319-20.
108 Id. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the Satco decision in Palmer v. Orthokinetics, Inc.,
611 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1980). The court required that the Graham inquiries be strictly ob-
served but found that synergism was one factor to be considered in the final determination
of obviousness. Id. at 323.
109 594 F.2d at 1322.
110 The confusion among the circuit courts regarding synergism has afforded the Su-
preme Court the opportunity to define synergism clearly and its relationship to obviousness
in a meaningful way. Unfortunately, the Court thus far has declined to address the issue by
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factual Graham inquiries.11 1 Without explaining the role a synergistic ef-
fect played in the final determination of obviousness, the Court examined
the combination involved in each case for a synergistic effect.1 12 The Su-
preme Court implicitly defined synergism as a combined effect that is
greater than the sum of the effects of the individual parts.113 The Court
developed this inquiry out of a concern that, eventually, any mechanic
skilled in the art could discover the arrangement of old elements claimed
in a combination patent and, therefore, only some new result could save
the combination from being obvious.1 1
The Sakraida and Black Rock opinions did not definitively develop
the concept of synergism, and thus, the Court is free to further its initial
development of a more workable concept of synergism as one indicia of
nonobviousness.
The Court should focus on the cooperative action of the elements in a
combination rather than the result of the combination. The resulting-ef-
fect definition of synergism focuses on the ultimate result achieved by the
combination.11 5 Section 103, however, requires that the subject matter of
a patent be nonobvious.116 The nonobviousness inquiry should be directed
to the making of the combination, not the resultant effect of the combina-
tion.1 1 7 If several elements are combined in such a way that they work
denying petitions for certiorari in all cases in which the determination of obviousness has
been framed to include a consideration of synergism.
In the first four months of 1980 the Supreme Court declined three opportunities to
define the precise role that synergism should play in the determination of obviousness under
§ 103. See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1276 (1980); Sims v. Mack Truck Corp., 608 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1319 (1980); Osmose Wood Preserving Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 605
F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1597 (1980).
1 See 396 U.S. at 59-60; 425 U.S. at 278-79; text accompanying notes 43-53 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 54-73 supra.
's See text accompanying notes 76-109 supra. See also Definition of Synergism, supra
note 2, at 1051. Judge Giles Rich of the.United States Court of Custom and Patent Appeals,
is extremely critical of the Court's dictum in Black Rock. Judge Rich interpreted Justice
Douglas' reference to synergism as superfluous to the decision which rested completely upon
the obvious-nonobvious standard. Judge Rich, however, predicted that trial lawyers and
lower courts would place an undue amount of emphasis on the unfortunate mention of the
overly severe synergism standard. Rich, supra note 33, at 41-45. See also Schneider, Non-
Obviousness, the Supreme Court, and the Prospects for Stability, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 304
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Schneider].
14 See Sears, supra note 1, at 98. Sears argues that a synergistic effect is significant to
the second prong of the Graham inquiry. Viewed in this manner, a synergistic effect can
save a combination of old elements from being insignificantly different from the scope of
prior art. Id.
"1' The district court decision in Black Rock quoted the A&P decision in finding that
for a combination to be patentable, the "concert of known elements must contribute some-
thing." The district judge relied on the fact that the individual elements functioned no dif-
ferently when combined than when each element functioned separately in succession in
making the determination that the patent was invalid for obviousness. 308 F. Supp. at 946.
116 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976); note 7 supra.
117 See Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 969-71.
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together effectively and in an inventive manner, the very act of combining
the elements should meet the nonobvious requirement of section 103. Ex-
amining a combination for synergism, defined as the elements functioning
interdependently or concertedly, however, would focus on the manner in
which the elements are combined.
This focus on the manner in which the elements work together also
would incorporate the constitutional limitation against removing existing
knowledge from the public domain.118 Recognizing the need for special
guidelines for combination patents, the Court in A&P cautioned that
when a combination is merely an aggregation of known elements, a patent
for the combination would unjustifiably withdraw knowledge from the
public domain.1 9 The A&P Court thus recognized that granting a patent
for an obvious aggregation of elements would frustrate the constitutional
intent against granting monopolies for mere improvements.1 20 The Court
implicitly found that since the elements of the combination functioned
independently rather than concertedly, the aggregation was insufficient to
meet the requirements of patentability.1
21
In developing a proper concept of synergism, the Court should rule
that a combination in which the elements exhibit interrelated or con-
certed action demonstrates synergism. A cooperative action of elements is
one valid indication that the combination is not obvious under section
103. The three-prong Graham test, however, should be retained as the
primary analysis of nonobviousness.'22 If the combination is clearly non-
obvious on the basis of the Graham test, a finding of synergism should
not be required for patentability. Moreover, the presence of synergism in
a combination should not compel a finding of nonobviousness if the mak-
ing of the combination is clearly obvious to one skilled in the art.12 Syn-
ergism can be a useful concept in patent law if the Supreme Court devel-
ops a clear, workable definition of the concept and explicitly states that
the presence of synergism is one indication, but not an absolute require-
ment, of section 103 nonobviousness.
KATHLEEN MARIE FENTON
18 See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
11 340 U.S. at 152.
8 See text accompanying note 59 infra. But see Schneider, supra note 85, at 321-25.
1 340 U.S. at 151-52.
122 See Sims v. Mack Truck Corp., 608 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1979); Deering Milliken Res.
Corp. v. Beaunit Corp., 538 F.2d 1022 (4th Cir. 1976); text accompanying notes 92-100
supra.
123 See Sears, supra note 1, at 98 n.74.
[Vol. XXXVII
